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ABUSE OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND FABRICATED CONTROVERSY:
TWO PROPOSALS
by John A. ~ u m b a c h '

The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance oj
Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and
motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all
just
I. A CRISIS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
Public faith in the legal profession is not merely low but, according to recent polling3it has been
declining at a disturbing rate. OC4. profession's unfortunate ethical reputation is not exactly news, of
course, but the rapidity of the downward trend is cause for renewed concern. During the past decade
the percentage of people willing to rate layers' honesty and ethical standards as "high" or "vety high"
has dropped from 22% to 13%, an average decline of nearly 1% per year.4According to the pollsters,
l a y e r s are ranked among "the five professions and occupations considered least honest by the
American public,'" and the legal profession is among the three that had "lost the most in the ratings over
the last ten years."6 While these polls may not be perfect reflections of public sentiment, it seems safe to
say that, in terms of our reputation for ethics and honesty, the past 10 years have not exactly been a
decade of progress.
One can, of course, debate the importance of such public opinions. If, however, the old Canons
were right, it may be "peculiarly essential" to the long-term stability of our American form of
government that the public can trust the l a y e r s who steward its laws and its justice.' As long as people
do not trust the integrity of the layers who administer the legal system, they will never fmd it easy to
trust the system as a whole, and the distrust of l a y e r s runs deep. The documented public cynicism
about l a y e r ethics and trustworthiness is, therefore, no mere trifling concern. It is a valuable measure of

' Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, 78 North Broadway, Whte Plains, N.Y. 10603 (914-422-4239).
Several of the problems dealt with here are also the subject of parallel discussiom contained in written testimony
prepared by the author for the E h c s 2000 Commission of the American Bar Association and in John A. Humbach,
Tke N&nalAssociation ofHonestLawyers,AnEssay onHones@, 'Lawyer Hones@" andpublic Trust m theLegal Systeq 20
PaceL. Rev. 93 (1999).
AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION
CANONSOF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICSPreamble (1 908) (hereinaftere'ABA CANONS").
Leslie McAneny, NwsesDlrplacePhamvclrtsat Top ofExpandedHones@andEthicsPol1, Gallup Release of Nov. 16,
1999, available atht~://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr991116.asp.
ld
A-.
Id. This ranking on Gallup's "Bottom Five list" was based on the percentages of people who listedthe profession
as low or very low in terms of honesty and ethics, when asked the question: "Please tell me how you would rate the
honesty and ethical standards of people in these different fields -veIy high, high, average, low or veIy low? First, ...
Next . W O M ORDER]." Id. Members of the medical professions were ranked the highest in honesty and
ethical standards. Id
Id. As a result of the recent declines, lawyers now have an overall ranking that is just below that of real estate
agents and just above that of gun salesmen. Id However, contraIy to popular myth, lawyers have consistently
ranked well above car salesmen, at least since the late 1970s, surely a point of some distinction. Id. at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indhnsty~cs.asp
and
http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indhnsty~cs2.asp
ABA CANONSMeamble.

'

how well the profession is performing its responsibilities of self-regulation.
Mistrust and the Model R u l e s I t is doubtful that the legal profession's poor reputation for
honesty and ethical standards could be so persistent without some genuine foundation in layers' norms
of behavior. Yet, most layers are actually quite scrupulous (at least in my experience) about observing
what they believe is expected of them under the profession's ethical standards. The possibility must
therefore be at least considered that there is something about the ethical standards themselves that leads
layers to act in ways the public fmds repugnant.
A principal purpose of this article is to consider the hypothesis that the public's view of layers
is tied directly to negative reactions people have to two related advocacy norms that seem to be rooted
. ~ norms are typically expressed in two
in provisions of the Model Rules of Professional C ~ n d u c tThese
particular practices of layers, namely: (1) pretending to disagree in the hope that, by not "conceding" a
point, the l a y e r might get the client an added chance to avoid a legally prescribed liability, sanction,
nonsuit or other undesired outcome; and (2) fostering misunderstandings by selectively invoking
confidentiality in order to hide material parts of the trutb while vigorously (and misleadingly) asserting
others. The fmt of these practices, which I shall call "fabricating controversy," is sometimes described
more charitably as endeavoring "to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause.'" The
emerges from a joint reading of the Model Rules on
second, which I shall call "partial-truth advo~acy,"'~
confidentiality and on diligence."
Both of these practices are likely to be stoutly defended by many in the bar, perhaps even as
' ~ the same, however, neither of these practices would likely
crucial aspects of the adversq s y ~ t e m .At
be recognized as fully "honest" or "ethical" as those conceptions are generally understood in ordinq,
non-layer contexts. No one finds it easy to trust people who pretend things in order to get better than
they deserve or who induce false understandings by means of partial disclosures and "half-truths." Yet,
both of these norms of advocacy behavior are reinforced and propagated by a fair reading of the
current Model Rules. Before much progress can be made to rehabilitate our profession's reputation for
honesty and ethical standards, it will probably be necessq that the Model Rules themselves be clarified
in certain respects.

MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
(1983), as set forth A AMERICAN BARASSOCIATION,
ANNOTATED
MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT(4th ed. 1999) (hereinafter "MODELRULES"). Adopted in most of the
states, the Model Rules contain modifications that vary from state to state.
MODELRULE$ Rule 3.1, cmt. [I].
10
A fuller and more precise definition of patial-truth advocacy appears in part I11 "Abuse of Confidentiality," inpa.
11
MODELRULESRule 1.6AND Rule 1.3,respectively.
12
This is a claim of necessity that is, to say the leasf debatable. See Joint Conference onProfessiona1
Responsibility, P r o f e m o n d R e s p o d d @ : R e p ~ o f t h JomtCo$erence,
e
44 A.B.A.J.1158 (1959, reprmted m GEOFFREY
RESPONSIBILITY
AND REGULATION
148-51 (3d
C. HAZARD,JR. AND DEBORAHL. RHODE,THELEGALPROFESSION:
ed. 1994) (specifically decrying the misuse of partisan advocacy to mislead distort or obfuscate, and declaring that a
lawyer "trespassa against the obligations of professional responsibilities when his desire to win leads him to
muddy the headwaters of decision"). See alsoPeter C. Kostant, BreedmgBetter Watchdogs:Mul~~ciplUUyPar62ersh@s
inCorporateLegdPractice, 84 M I ~ Rev.
L 1213, 1215-19,1253-58(2000) (obsenring that the profession's [rleliance
on a flawed model of legal e h c s " has led to other serious problems as well, helping to pave the way for competition
from so-called multi&sciplimry practice f k s ) .

The balance of this article will be framed as a discussion of two proposals for modifying the
Model Rules. One muld declare fabricated controversy to be out of bounds as a tactical tool. The
other would expressly a f f i that it is an abuse of confidentiality for lamyers to engage in strategies of
partial-truth advocacy, to assert partial truths while deliberately blding back other information that the
l a y e r should know is needed in order not to mislead others. Both of these techniques, fabrication of
controversy and partial-truth advocacy, tend to undercut the trial as a "search for truth"I3 and both
interfere with negotiations as a search for fairness in transactions.I4 Both, moreover, are utilized by
l a y e r s precisely because they undercut and interfere with the intended functioning of these processes.
They are resorted to by diligent advocates when factual truth would ill-serve the client's interest at trial,
and by diligent negotiators when truthful disclosure would likely prevent a client from getting a deal that
the other party would make only if deluded.I5 Finally, and worst of all, both of these layering
techniques detract from the legal system's ability to achieve the "gold standard" of justice and the rule of
law, viz. the substance of the law applied to the events that actually occur.
11. FABRICATING CONTROVERSY

Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice
against lawyers . . . than does the false claim, often set up by the
unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of
the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his
client's cause.'6
The first of the two reputatiomimpairing practices I will discuss is fabricating controversy, the
strategic technique of pretending to disagree on issues of procedure or substance in an effort to obtain
an ultimate resolution that the client likes better than having "the substance of the law applied to the
events that actually occurred." When l a y e r s fabricate controversy they are making a play on basic
features of the dispute-resolution process itself--the costs it imposes on the opponent, the uncertainties
it engenders, and the opportunity for lucky accidents that it provides. By raising disingenuous disputes
that then require "process" to resolve, a skillful l a y e r can exploit the potentials for error that are
intrinsic to the process itself and turn those potentials to the client's advantage. Thus, when clients want
to escape the law's prescribed liabilities or sanctions for things they have done, or to obtain other
unmerited benefits, l a y e r s have a lawful way to advance these client "interests." By contesting issues
on which the parties do not really disagree, a diligent advocate can secure for the client an added
chance to "snatch victoty from the jaws of defeat."
NLXv m t e s i d e , 475 U S . 157,164 (1986).
See Russell B. Korobkin, A P o f i e Tkeoy oflegdNegotidon, 88 GeorgetownLJ 1789,1818-29 (2000), identifying
the strategic imperatives of negotiations as agreeing on a single deal-point that allocates "surplus" ("surplus
allocation") within the defined range of possible agreements. The result would be an agreement that is mutually
beneficial and in that sense, fair.
15
The mles do not, of course, permit the lawyer to assist the client in committing perjury or fraud. See MODELRULE$
Rule 12(d) andRule 3.3. But the narrow interpretations of these limitations have left ample leeway for lawyers to make
effective use of fabricated controversy and padial-truth advocacy to help their clients escape tight situations. See,
e.g., Bronston v. United States, 409 U S . 352 (1973) (no perju~yif witness states the "literal tmth); Schatz v.
Rosenberg ,943 F 2 d 485 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding, despite bar's condemnation, assertion of confidentiality mle to
conceal information concerning the clients' disastrous financial condition because disclosure by the attorney would
probably have caused the other pady to reject the clients' promissory notes and guarantees in a sale of corporate
securities).
l6 ABA CANONSCanon 15.
l3
14

As long as pretended disputations are not frivolous or dilatoty," many l a y e r s see nothing
wrong with such plays on the system's fact-fmding imperfections. Nor do they see anyhng wrong with
wing to get their clients better than the clients legally deserve, for example, by avoiding the prescribed
consequences for wrongs they have committed. The vety fact that many layers see things this way is,
of course, part of the reason for the public's negative perception of the profession.
The current Model Rules do not seem to condemn these practices, either. The Model Rules do
contain provisions that prohibit "frivolous" contentions and dilatoty tactics.I8However, as we shall see,"
these prohibitions apparently do not prevent a l a y e r from asserting contentions that have a reasonable
likelihood of being upheld even if the la\?yer h o w s (or reasonably should h o w ) that success in the
contention will depend on somebody making a mistake, most likely by inaccurate fact fmding. Consider,
for example, a l a y e r who has confidential information from which the l a y e r reasonably should h o w
that the client's cause lacks substantive merit, e.g., the client really committed the tort alleged but the
l a y e r nevertheless believes the case can be won. The lawyer may believe it can be won because, for
example, the plaintiffs key witnesses are particularly vulnerable on cross-examination or because
certain information the plaintiffs need to make their case is almost certainly beyond their reach or, even,
unsuspected by them. I dare say few layers would maintain that there would be anyhng frivolous or
dilatoty about going for victoty in such a case. The current Model Rules on frivolous and dilatoty
contentions would seem to allow it and, arguably, Model Rule 1.3 (Diligence) may even command it.''
Nevertheless, to achieve legal victoty without substantive merit is not justice, and winnability
alone is not a just standard of meritoriousness. To make it clear that the profession's responsibility to
justice does not permit l a y e r s to seize evety available legal victoty, irrespective of actual factual merit,
the Model Rules should contain an explicit prohibition on fabricating controversy, which might read as
follows:

A l a y e r shall not fabricate controversy or otherwise pretend disagreements by putting
a point into contention when the l a y e r h o w s or reasonably should h o w that there is
no real difference between the parties' actual understandings of the facts or applicable
law.
Fabricated Controversy is Parasitic to the Basic Function of Legal P r o c e s s A l a y e r
may see a strategic value in contesting a factual point or issue even though, with reasonable investigation,
the l a y e r should h o w that the parties have no genuine disagreement on the point or issue. For
17

I.e., as long as they are reasonably well supported by the admissible evidence. See "Fabricated Controversy
Distinguished from Merely 'Frivolous' or 'Dilatory' Contentions," infra.
18
See MODELRULE$Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) and Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation),
respectively.
19
See "Fabricated Controversy Distinguished from Merely 'Frivolous' or 'Dilatory' Contentions," infra
20
Id. There are, for example, relatively recent ethics opinions to the effect that a lawyer can bring an action that the
lawyer knows to be time-barred or subject to an affirmative defense--presumably without mentioning the existence
of these fatal defects in the client's "cause." See Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Respomibility of Pa. Bar
Ass'n, Op. 96-80 (1996) ( h e barred); LegalEhcs Comm. of Or. State Bar, Op. 1991-21 (1991) (validaffinnative
defense); see also ABA Formal Opinion94-387 (disclosure to opposing party and court that statute of limitations has
-). A logical place to insert this new language would be in Model Rule 3.1, just after the current rule's first sentence.

example, even without any underlying disagreement on some factual point the l a y e r may still see value
in "making them prove it" simply because, on the particular evidence at hand the l a y e r has a
reasonable shot at success and success on the point would be to the client's advantage. It may save the
client i?om liability, sanction or other undesired legal consequence. In such situations there is, however,
actually only a pretense of controversy. In effect, the l a y e r is making a naked play on the legal
process, taking a stand in an effort to get a benefit or advantage that the substance of the law does not
mean to provide. Similarly, when l a y e r s invoke procedures, formal requirements or defenses merely
because the point seems "winnable" and advantageous, and not because there is any genuine
disagreement on the legally relevant facts, the dispute is again only a pretense. Raising the dispute into
controversy serves no purpose except to give the client a chance to gain from the process of disputeresolution itself. These pretended disputations are parasitic to the basic functioning of the legal process,
which exists to resolve real disputes. They can only add to the system's costs while distracting from its
mission, contributing to the public's impression that, with a smart l a y e r , a person can escape from the
burdens of the law.
The possibilities for pretending disagreement are manifold. Fabricated controversies can be
concocted as to matters of procedure or of substance. They may relate to minor collateral points or to
the core matters in question. However, whatever the specific context, the reason tbat fabricated
controversies can be successful is genemlly always the same, namely, like all human systems the law's
fact-fmding system is not perfect and can make mistakes. The traces left behind by legally relevant
events are often fragmentaty and conflicting. Witnesses may have background weaknesses that can
make cross-examination devastating even when their direct testimony is fully true. Or a crucial witness
may refuse to cooperate, or may fail to appear entirely." Because of these and other elements of chance
that are endemic to the process, skillful advocates can sometimes paint pictures of past events that are
vety different, legally speaking, from the events that actually occurred or they can, alternatively, keep
the opponent from presenting a picture that is true. It can all be done, moreover, without resort to direct
falsehoods or other illegality.
While the discussion that follows here will focus on the litigation context, it bears remembering
that the vety same sorts of parasitic resort to phony disputation can also occur in the context of
transactions. By judiciously raising disputes over this or that issue, a l a y e r in negotiations can
obfuscate, distract and otherwise create needs for a negotiated "resolutions," so the layer's client can
then gain extra advantages from the resolutions that result, even when there was no real disagreement in
the fmt place.23This manner of bargaining may be regarded as simply "smart" negotiating tactics, or as
underhanded depending on your point of view.

Winnability vs. Justice-As evety l a y e r knows, there can be a big difference between
being entitled to a legal outcome and being able to prove the facts that the law requires in order to
establish that entitlement. This discrepancy between provability md entitlement can be the source of
much injustice, and it can occur due to a variety of imperfections in the fact-finding process. For
example, as noted in the preceding section, it can occur because one of the parties, due to bad luck or
happenstance, simply lacks access to sufficient admissible evidence to prove the truth. It can occur
22
For example, an impecunious insured who is the "client" of an insurance defense lawyer may have no incentive to
take paJt in the defense at all-especially if the policy has been cancelled.
23
See Korobkin, supra note 14.

because juries and others can make mistakes or be misled-especially if one of the advocates is
forcefully pressing a portion of the trutb while deliberately concealing the remainder (see "Abuse of
Confidential@," infra). Also, it can occur because parties sometimes are simply unable to afford what it
takes to establish facts which with greater resources, they could readily have proved. Most generally,
"imperfections" in the process can be understood to refer to any factor whatsoever whose effect is to
allow a party, without violating any law or rule, to prevent the substance of the law from applying to the
facts that actually occurred.
Whatever the source of the imperfections, l a y e r s and their clients may be understandably
tempted to take advantage of them when, otherwise, the "law is against them" but they nonetheless
desire to obtain a certain legal benefit (e.g., a money judgment) or to avoid a legally prescribed
detriment or sanction. So even when there is no real disagreement with other side, and therefore no real
"dispute" for the law's dispute-resolution machinety to resolve, they may be tempted to see the
machinety itself as an opportunity, a chance for profit. By simply setting the machinety in motion on one
or another potentially pivotal point, the l a y e r gets an added opportunity to turn defeat into victoty by
taking advantage of the potential for error, for chance or for other miscarriage that is inherent in legal

To some extent these sorts of systemic risks are unavoidable, and it will probably never be
possible to eliminate entirely the perennial discrepancies that exist between actual legal entitlements and
provability-in-fact-between winnability and justice. This does not mean, however, that the profession
should condone conscious efforts by l a y e r s to seize the fortuitous advantages that may be gleaned
from these discrepancies. Sometimes, too, l a y e r s may simply not h o w whether their client's cause
has substantive merit or not; there may be simply no reason to h o w whether the underlying facts are in
any way different from what the available evidence indicates. It does not, however, follow that l a y e r s
are free to engage in "willful blindne~s'"~
and pretend controversy in cases where they do have reason
to h o w . On the contrary, if on reasonable investigation a l a y e r should h o w the client's cause is not
just, either in whole or in some particular, the ethics of our profession should clearly prohibit the
fabrication of controversy in an effort to pretend otherwise. While it may be in the client's "interest" to
gain legal advantages or to avoid disadvantages contrary to the substantive intentions of the law, it is not
in society's interest or the profession's interest for l a y e r s to knowingly assist them in these ends. It is
24

Even couts, which are presumably well situated to know, sometimes characterize legal processes as "rolling the
dice."E.g.,U.S. Bancorp Mo*. Co. v. Bonner MallPshp., 513 U S . 18, 28 (1994);United States v. Graves, 98 F 3 d
258, 260 (7th Cir. 1996); Federated Rural Elec. Im. CO.v Arkamas Elec. Coops., 48 F 3 d 294 (8th Cir. 1994). "[A] j u ~ y
determination, unpredctable in the most neutral circumstances." Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U S . 323,360
(1 974)(dissenting opinion).
21
A term originating in the criminal law field, to deal with people who try to evade mem rea requirements by
assuming an ostrich-like attitude toward the facts of what they are doing. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F 2 d
697 (9th Cir. 1976);WAYNELAFATE AND AUSTINSCOTT,CRIMINALLAW219-220 (2d ed. 1986). Sometimes cited as
an instmctive example of willful blindness in an attorney is Dr. Johmon's famous reply to Boswell when asked "what
he thought of 'supporting a cause which you know to be bad'." He said: "Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad
till the Judge determines it." See Wong v. Tabor, 422N.E. 2d 1279,1286 (Ind. App. 1981). However, as Dr. Johnson
made clear, he was not referring to willful blindness with regard tofm&but was only reflecting a lawyer's normal
cautious agnosticism about future judicial interpretations of law, for he added flatly: "I have said that you are to
state the facts fairly." Id. A good deal of the problem of fabricated controversy emerges, it is submitted from a
maladroit adaptation to contentions of fact of the "winnability" standard of frivolousness, w h c h is more fittingly
confined to arguments of law.

to these latter kinds of cases that the above-suggested addition to the Model Rules is meant to apply

Fabricated Controversy Distinguished From Merely "Frivolous" or "Dilatory"
Contentions- The justice effects of fabricated controversies may be reason to deplore them, but a fair
interpretation of the current Model Rules seems to allow l a y e r s to raise issues without any real
underlying disagreement as long as there is a reasonable chance of prevailing. The specific Model Rules
that come closest to dealing with the question are Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and contention^)'^ and
Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation)." These two rules forbid frivolous and dilatoty advocacy, respectively.
However, neither of these rules gives reason to think it is ethically wrong to raise an issue or contest a
point just because the purpose is to obtain an ultimate outcome that is better for the client than "the
substance of the law applied to the events that actually occurred." That is to say, neither gives reason to
think it is wrong to controvert a point simply because the goal happens to be to help the client avoid a
legally prescribed liability, sanction, nonsuit or other such "merited unpleasantness. On the contrary,
under both of these rules a la\?yer is apparently justified in assetting a contention in litigation as long as
the point has some chance of being winnable.28
The comments to the Model Rules make clear (and the rules themselves leave little doubt) that
dilatoty refers to contentions raised for purposes of delay," and that the conception of "frivolous"
contentions focuses on actions "primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person"30
or contentions that are so obviously without merit there is virtually no likelihood a court would accept
them.31In other words, under the Model Rules' conceptions of frivolous and dilatoty, a position would
be vindicated as non-iiivolous and nomdilatoty as long as a tribunal reasonabiy might sustain it. Ifthe
law and available evidentiaq facts are such that a contention has a reasonable likelihood of being
supportable or tenable in court, the contention would not be considered dilatoty or frivolous, as
traditionally understo~d.~~
The adversarial tactic of fabricating controversies or pretending disagreement is, however, vety
26

"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for
doing so that is not frivolous . . " MODELRULE$Rule 3.1
27
"A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." MODEL
RULESRule 3.2.
28
See United States v. Edwards, 777 F 2 d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 1985) (defining frivolousness in terms of "arguments that
cannot conceivably persuade the court"); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OF THE LAWGOVERNING
LAWYERS5 110 a n t . d
(2000) ("A frivolous position is one that a lawyer of ordinary competence would recognize as so lacking in merit that
there is no substantial possibility that the tribunal would accept it"); AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION,
ANNOTATED
MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT300 (4th ed. 1999), clnngln re Graham, 453 N.W., 2d 31 3,322 (Mmn 1990)
("what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his professional functions, would do in the same or similar
circumstances"). See akoABAForma1 Opin 94-387 (1994)(lawyer may press she-barred claim as long as no
affirmative misrepresentation is made). C j Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F 2 d 1043, 1047 (2d Clr. 1990) (for purposes of federal
Rule 11, frivolous means no chance of success on law); Wong v. Tabor, 422 N E 2 d 1279,1287 (Ind App. 1981) (if
grounds exist to "support," malicious prosecution does not lie); Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, 120
A T E MOF
E THE
N T LAWGOVERNDIGLAWYERS5
Cal. Rptr 291,297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) ( " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ) ; R E ~ T(THIRD)
57(2) and cmt d and Reporter's Note to cmt. d (2000) (liability of lawyer for malicious prosecution), relying heavily on
analogous comments in the SecondRestatement of Torts, discussedinfranote 38.
29
See MODELRULE$Rule 3.2, cmt.
30
See MODELRULE$Rule 3.1, cmt [2] (last sentence of second paragraph).
31 Id.
32
See supra note 28

dzerent from dilatoty or frivolous contentions, as traditionally understood; it is a distinctly unethical way
to secure a legal advantage or to avoid a legal disadvantage. Fabricated controversy is not only vety
dzerent from traditional frivolous or dilatoty advocacy but it is systemically much worse. The worst
impact of iiivolous or dilatoty contentions is usually only to cause expense, wheel-spinning and
perhaps, untoward pressure to settle. By contrast, the tactical purpose of fabricated controversy is to
try to actually win, despite the fact that a proper substantive predicate for victoty is absent. In other
words, the fabrication of controversy is a directed effort not just to delay or distract the rule of law but
actually to derail it, by inducing a court or others to accept ultimate factual conclusions that neither the
l a y e r nor the client takes to be true. Indeed the defming characteristic of fabricated controversy is that
a factual (or legal) position is advocated even though it does not correspond to the beliefs about past
events or the law that either the l a y e r or the client actually holds.33Thus, while alleged instances of
frivolous or dilatoty contentions can be erased or vindicated by a victoty in court, the vice of fabricated
controversy is actually enhanced by victoty. The fact that the l a y e r manages to succeed in fooling a
tribunal on a matter of trutb does not mean that urging the counterfactual position was legitimate
advocacy or that the outcome was just. The fallibility or gullibility of juries, judges or negotiating
counterparts is not the test of whether conduct is honest.
It may be objected, of course, that the foregoing description of "frivolousness" is too narrow,
and that the Model Rules already prohibit fabricated controversy under the rubric of "fiivolous"
conduct. This is possible, but it is not likely-and in any case such a prohibition (if it exists) is certainly
not vety conspicuous. It is true that nothing contained in Rule 3.1 explicitly prevents a person i?om
reading the conception of frivolousness more broadly than the rule's comments suggest, so that it would
encompass layers' efforts to play the legal process by fabricating controversy. Since, however, Rule
3.1 is, in effect, an exception to the layer's core duty to diligently advance the client's interests,34I
think most l a y e r s would probably regard such a expansive reading to be highly dubious. As long as
nothing in Rule 3.1 expressly forbids l a y e r s from wing to seize the fortuitous advantages that might be
gained by plays on the process (as long as this can be done without breaking the law), a l a y e r may feel
obliged to do so. A l a y e r may feel obliged that is, to bring or defend a proceeding, or to assert or
controvert an issue, even when the l a y e r h o w s or reasonably believes that the larger outcome being
sought is not merited under the actual facts and applicable law. 35
The example given earlier of a l a y e r who should h o w , on the basis of confidential
information, that the client's tort defense case lacks substantive merit, that the client really committed the
tort alleged is but one kind of case. Situations like this can be multiplied as clients engage l a y e r s in the
hope of avoiding their legal comeuppances for past behavior, imploring their l a y e r s to "get me out of
this." In real life, of course, factual histoty is often fairly messy, and l a y e r s many times do not h o w the
33

See proposed addition to the Model Rules, supra note 21
See MODELRULE$Rule 1.3.
31
The comment to Rule 3.1 specifies that the advocate has "a duty not to abuse legal procedure." MODELRULE$
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actual facts with much cettainty. Under present Rule 3.1, however, the l a y e r has no duty even to try
to form a reasonable belief on whether the client's cause is a just one within the intendment of the law.36
Thus, the l a y e r may fairly conclude from present Rule 3.1 that, in the name of "not beingjudge-andjuty of my own client," the l a y e r should adopt a posture of willful blindne~s,~'
to "see no evil, hear no
evil," so the lawyer can assert with a clear conscience contentions that the actual facts do not
The ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission has proposed modifications to Model Rule 3.1 and their
proposed modifications would remedy some of these difficulties. Under the proposals, for example, it
would be a violation of professional ethics for a l a y e r to "bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis in law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous."39A new proposed sentence in the comments would make clear that
"reasonably believes" means a l a y e r would at least be expected to investigate and to form a
reasonable belief and could no longer resort to willful blindness, as described in the preceding
paragraph.
However, the Commission's proposal still would not remedy the distinct problem of fabricated
as opposed to merely frivolous or dilatoty conduct. In the Commission's proposal, the pivotal criterion
for action still centers on the concept of "frivolous," and that concept is still defined in the traditional
narrow terms of harassment, malicious injuty or machinations that are legally hopeless-too narrow to
reach the problem of fabricated controversy. Therefore, the Commission's proposed modifications still
would not declare it improper for l a y e r s to make plays on the system's fact-fmding imperfections to
avoid or defeat the substance of the law. L a y e r s still would be able to say that, under a fair
interpretation of Rule 3.1, it is enough to justlfy asserting a contention in litigation that the point has a
chance of being winnable.
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Fabricating Controversies and the Challenge of "Equal Justice'-It is frequently
observed that there is a substantial shortfall in legal services to the less well off in our society, and that
addressing this shortfall is among the impottant responsibilities of our profession. However, it is likely
that one of the principal contributing causes of this shortfall is our particular vision of the adversq
system. One particularly problematic aspect of that vision is the idea that, if a case has a reasonable
chance of being won, then the l a y e r ought to pursue it with the full force of zealous representation,
even if l a y e r has "confidential" howledge that the cause may be substantively unmerited. For
instance, according to this vision, a l a y e r for a corporation should zealously defend the corporation
against a tort claim even if the l a y e r confidentially h o w s that the corporation's employees indeed
committed the tort in question, acting in the scope of their employment. Even worse, some prosecutors
think they are entitled to bring the full force of the state down on a defendant
even when they do not themselves believe the defendant is guilty; they think it is enough to prosecute
that a jury can probably be persuaded to convict.40As long as the l a y e r believes the case canbe won
or plausibly defended on the "facts" and law, the current ethic seems to allow (and perhaps, even,
require) that the l a y e r press for victoty as zealously as possible-whatever may be the layer's actual
private assessment of the basis for the action. Rather than seeing service to justice as being any part of
any layer's individual ethical responsibility, it is viewed instead as solely and exclusively the
responsibility of the system as a whole.
However, this aspect of our particular adversq ethic has especially unfortunate effects when a
layer's zealous representation skills are unleashed full force against a person who is either poorly
represented or not represented at all. It is especially the persons who are in under-represented classes
in our society who are likely to be unable to adequately test and rebut the evidence that is mounted
against them. It is especially the under-represented who will likely be unable to make the case for
prevailing even when, on the law and facts, they should. The problem of "unequal justice" has no simple
solution, but it would at least be mitigated if, unlike today, all l a y e r s had a clear ethical responsibility to
refrain from fabricated controversy in situations where they h o w , or reasonably should h o w , that their
clients should not prevail. By clearly prohibiting the fabrication of controversy, the Model Rules would
better assure that the negative effects of the present shortfall of legal services is not exacerbated by the
adversq excesses of the legal profession itself
Summing up the Problem of Fabricated ControversyTo make clear that it is wrong to
concoct controversy in the hope of provoking an ultimate legal miscarriage, there must be additional
language, beyond the changes proposed by the Ethics Zl00 Commission. The Model Rules need an
amendment, such as the one suggested above, to make it clear that the adversarial tactic of fabricating
controversies, or pretending disagreement on any point of contention, is a distinctly unethical way to
secure a legal advantage or to avoid a legal disadvantage. Given the traditionally limited understanding of
the frivolousness and dilatoriness concepts, the Model Rules need a specific reference to pretended or
fabricated controversy, as set forth in the suggested language above.
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111. ABUSE OF CONFIDENTALlTY

The of$ce of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand. . . any manner of
fraud or chicane.4'
Layer-client confidentiality provides important public benefits, but there are also significant
detriments that can flow from its misuse.42When layers routinely withhold "damaging" information,
their calculated nomdisclosures and partial disclosures can foreseeably lead to false understandings in
the minds of others. Obviously, it is not the purpose of ihe l a y e r duty of coniidentiality to foster false
understandings; it is merely an unintended by-product. To make partial disclosures of fact with a
purpose to deceive or when material deception is foreseeable, whether it be done in bargaining or in
litigation, is an abuse of confidentiality.

In order to preserve the benefits of coniidentiality while preventing the detriments and abuses
that can occur, a new paragraph (c) should be added to Rule 1.6, as follows:
(c) It is an abuse of confidentiality for a l a y e r , in any proceeding or matter, to pursue a
strategy or design of selectively revealing information when the l a y e r has or claims a
duty to conceal other information without which the revealed information would be
misleading or deceptive on any issw of material fact.
The purposes of this proposed new paragraph would be to clarlfy that Rule 1.6 is not intended
to foster deception; it would expressly prohibit l a y e r s from misusing coniidentiality as part of
stratagems of partial-truth advocacy. "Partial-truth advocacy" means any form of advocacy that is
intended to distract from or obfuscate the material facts of a matter, or to cause others to form
erroneous conclusions about such facts, by affiatively stressing part of the trutb while asserting a duty
to hide other parts of the truth. The proposed new paragraph would declare that l a y e r s have a
professional obligation to refmin from knowingly pressing or advancing half-truths in the representation
of clients.

Detriments that Can Flow From Abuses of Confidentiality-Contidentiality is, for many
practical reasons, a crucial feature of the layer-client relationship. The rule of coniidentiality is not,
however, an unalloyed benefit to clients, the profession or the system of justice. There is a dehite
downside evety time a l a y e r claims an ethical duty to conceal some key part of the truth. The major
downside is, of course, that the rule of confidentiality causes otherwise "available" and material
information to be withheld from persons who need it to make informed judgments in private matters and
to cany out justice in accordance with the law.43Despite the vety important objectives that justify
confidentiality, its use must therefore be kept in careful balance with the needs of justice, which depends
on truth. When truth will bring a client unpleasant consequences, there is obviously a temptation to
disguise or conceal. But the law can only apply to the facts that are before it. Ifthe facts are distorted by
41
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partial truths, so will be the application of the law, and justice will founder
These negative effects are not, moreover, confiied to miscarriages of justice in individual cases.
The misuse by l a y e r s of the rule of confidentiality is no doubt partly responsible for the deep-seated
wariness and apprehension that the public feels toward layers, for the idea that l a y e r s deal regularly
there is a
in half-truths all too often having something up their sleeves. As surveys cited earlier
widespread public impression that l a y e r s cannot be fundamentally trusted. This distrust is unfohnate
not merely for the profession but for the whole justice system. The misuse of confidentiality may
sometimes work to the advantage of certain clients, but the advantage is purchased at a high cost. When
layers misuse confidentiality and deal in partial truths they reduce their credibility overall, a detriment to
all of the la\?yers1clients. When justice is in the hands of professionals whose full and unstinting fidelity
to truth is a matter not merely of doubt but also of abundant grim humor, the effect can hardly strengthen
public trust in the rule of law.
The Model Rules should clearly reflect that the proper purpose of confidentiality is not to
obstruct the truth; that is only a regrettable by-product. The proper role of the rule of confidentiality is to
shield the client, so the client can be open with his or her l a y e r without fear that the l a y e r might later
When, however, a l a y e r deliberately adopts and
step forward to bear witness for the adversa~y.~~
pursues a strategy of partial truth advocacy, of presenting certain evidence while selectively withholding
other material evidence, the rule of confidentiality acts not merely as a shield but becomes, instead, a
tool of attack. It becomes a device or scheme to distort, deceive and obstruct.
Obstruction is precisely what occurs when a l a y e r zealously urges the existence of certain facts
while willfully concealing other facts that the l a y e r reasonably knows are needed to avoid fostering
false or erroneous inferences. Whether the layer's immediate purpose is merely to distract from the
truth or to distort it, the ultimate goal is the same: to prevent the substance of applicable laws from
applying to the facts that actually occurred-to derail the rule of law.
Ordinary Honesty and "Honesty" Under Model Rule 1 . 6 . 4 s stated in the introduction,
most l a y e r s are rather scrupulous about their ethics and careful to avoid lies; yet the public's distrust of
layers runs deep. If layers seldom lie, why the bad reputation for honesty? The problem is, I th&
rooted in a variance of ideas of the vety concept of "honesty," a variance that is reflected in the Model
Rules. Among the public at large, honesty in not generally understood in merely the cramped and
narrow sense that layers often have in mind ("no outright lies") but in a far more expansive sense. In
this broader sense, an honest person means someone who takes care never to mislead other people. It
means a person who does not make it a practice to deliberately hold back crucially pertinent information
while w i n g to persuade others. Foremost, an honest person means one who regards responsibility for
the full and complete truth to be the personal responsibility of each and evety individual, not as just the
collective responsibility of some larger "system."

By contrast, the lawyer's standard of honesty under Rule 1.6 is not nearly as onerous as the
M
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general public standard. The layer's standard of honesty is instead fitted to a particular conception
(albeit not a necessary conception) of the adversq system. In this version of the adversq system, the
advocates owe virtually their entire loyalty not to truth but to clients. The assumption behind Rule 1.6
seems to be that the full and open truth is not the personal responsibility of any individual l a y e r in
particular, but only of the justice system as a whole, a system in which the players may do whatever they
can, short of crime or outright lies, to encourage whichever misconceptions happen to serve their cause.
If any of the resulting misconceptions need to be corrected, it is up to the adversq to see that the job
gets done. Although an ethical l a y e r does not lie or help the client to lie, the l a y e r has a far more
subtle art. By carefully choosing what to disclose and conceal, the lawyer weaves stories that are false
out of statements that are true.
By purposely withholding information or willfully undermining accurate but "damaging" evidence,
l a y e r s can frequently cause jurors and others to form misleading impressions of their clients and past
events. Most l a y e r s would probably assert, moreover, that it is not merely the right but the duty of
l a y e r s to bend portrayals of the truth to their client's advantage, even if that means inducing others to
fall into mistaken beliefs. When a business client does not want to reveal the whole stoty in negotiating a
deal, it is not the layer's job to disturb the false impressions the other side forms as a result. If a guilty
client wants to say "I didn't cb it," then that client's nomguilt is the picture of reality the lawyer is
expected to convey. In effect, l a y e r s often encourage others to form conceptions of reality that do not
even purport to correspond to the actual facts as either the l a y e r or the client honestly sees them.
All of this is done, to be sure, with generally high objectives. There are obviously important
values other than truth,and most l a y e r s surely believe that the false impressions they may convey are
in pursuit of those values. However, those values do not include a "right" to obtain legal advantages that
are not merited under the actual facts of a case or to avoid legal disadvantages that the law would
prescribe if the full truth were revealed. When l a y e r s succeed in conveying false impressions in the
pursuit of unmerited legal advantages or to protect their clients from legal accountability, people feel that
justice has been not merely deceived but cheated. And for many outside the profession, that is a
problem.
It is not enough to say, in response to these concerns, that "no human system can be perfect."
By tolerating misuse of the rule of confidentiality in partial-truth advocacy, the present Rule 1.6 allows
the imperfections to be built right into the process, and the public has no trouble seeing this. Almost
evetyone suspects that the vety reason many clients seek legal counsel is to avoid the unpleasant
consequences that the law prescribes for cases such as theirs-stated bluntly, to avoid the intent of the
law. Some people simply do not want the results that the law provides for the actual facts of their
situation, and they think that, with a smart layer, "undesired legal results can be avoided, legally, under
the system that we have. And they are right.
The result, however, is a relatively high level of public distrust of layers, and that can readily
redound to the discredit of the justice system that l a y e r s maintain. The distrust is not, therefore, a
minor tangential annoyance or merely the problem of an insular profession, but it is something that can
cut to the heart of the public's basic civic faith in the rule of law. For better or worse, most people
probably think the core ideal of justice can only be served if the substance of the law applies to the
events that actually occur. The concept of "right" is seen as based on trutk and not merely a matter of
who wins regulated competitions to reinvent the past. People expect the law to provide genuinely

deserved results, not just "due" process.

As long as l a y e r s in negotiations and advocacy do not even purport to present the full and
objective truth as they or their clients honestly see it, no amount of professed concern about values
"other than truth" is going to change the declining esteem in which the public holds our profession and
the system ofjustice it maintains and serves.
The Special Problem of the Criminal Defense Context-It may seem hard in the civil
context to reach a better balance between the goals of confidentiality and the truth needs of justice, but
it may seem virtually impossible to do so in criminal defense. A criminal defendant has, after all, a
constitutional right to "effective assistance" of counsel in mounting the defense.46But how can a criminal
defense l a y e r possibly hope to convince a juty that the defendant is not guilty except by selectively
stressing the "helpfuY evidence while downplaying or hiding the damaging stuff! Partial-truth advocacy
seems integral to the process and, in many cases, the vety essence of the game. The fallacy here seems
to be the notion that an accused cannot be considered to have received effective assistance of counsel
unless the l a y e r has tried to assert a full-blown exoneration defense, if that is what the accused wants.

As far as the question of "effectiveness" goes, there does not appear to be any empirical
evidence that criminal defendants would be worse off, on the whole, if defense l a y e r s swore off
strategies of selective nomdisclosure and partial-truth advocacy. Indeed, innocent defendants
(presumably the ones we are most concerned to acquit) would probably be generally better off if
criminal defendants were represented by l a y e r s whose reputations for probity were beyond reproach.
When Chief Justice Earl Warren was a California county prosecutor, he and the public defender
developed a relationship of trust that apparently worked to the considerable advantage of the innocent
accused. Warren told the public defender that any time he was convinced Warren was prosecuting an
innocent person, he should tell Warren so. Then, according to the defender, Warren "would let me look
at his files and, if that didn't change my mind, Warren would not prosecute. He trusted me to be as
honest with him as he was with me." 47
What l a y e r s sometimes seem to forget is that, if criminal defense layers are none too
trustworthy in their manner of defense, it does none of their clients a service. A person who makes
himself generally not believable is one who will not be believed.48
For guilty defendants, of course, a believable l a y e r may not always be better. In particular,
having a lawyer who will not play games with truth may mean it will be hard to put on a successful
exoneration defense unless you can successfully bamboozle your own l a y e r . This would present a
clear drawback for guilty defendants who want to pretend innocence in the hope of getting an unmerited
reduction of charge, dismissal or decision not to prosecute. Ifthey tell their honest l a y e r the truth the
game may be up. By lying they take the substantial risk of depriving their lawyer of the truthful
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information the l a y e r may need to get the best deal. Even ifthis is so, however, it is still not a sound
reason for lawyers to try to get judges and juries to swallow versions of past events that they should
h o w are not true. L a y e r s should not dishonestly withhold information, pretend controversy or distract
from truth just so the guilty can have the aid of counsel to assert a false defense. In a world of honest
men and women, the scoundrel may be at a disadvantage, but that does not mean honest people should
act like scoundrels in order to compensate.
When all is said and done, it cannot be denied that it would probably be harmful to some
criminal defendants if all la\?yers eschewed all partial-truth advocacy. It is, however, equally likely that
such a change would provide a defmite advantage to other defendants, especially those who are
innocent or are "not-guilty-as-charged."These latter classes of defendants would almost certainly be
better off if their layers' presentations could be more readily belie~ed.~'
Still, it may be objected, there is the Constitution. It secures both a right to effective counsel and
a right to make the govemment prove its case. Thus, the argument goes, unless l a y e r s can pretend
their guilty clients' innocence even when they know the facts, clients will be forced to make an
unconstitutional choice: They will forced to choose between their constitutional right to effective counsel
and their constitutional right to put the govemment to its proof
Putting the matter like this, however, overstates the case. In the first place, "one cannot invoke
the Sixth Amendment [right to counsel] as a justification for presenting what might have been a halftruth.'"' Moreover, there 6 no suggestion that the mles against involuntaty self-incrimination or the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should not continue to apply in all their force. Even if
the defendant's counsel refused to engage in partial-truth advocacy, the govemment could still be put to
its proof The only suggestion is that a defendant who wants to controvert the government's case would
The defendant would not have a "right" to present misleading evidence
be expected to do so truthf~lly.~'
or knowingly disparage accurate proof in the hope that some undeserved advantage might emerge. The
Supreme Court has never held the Constitution to require more than this.
True, the accused has the ultimate authority to decide on whether to plead guilg2 and since the
lawyer must abide the defendant's choice, the lawyer has no right to throw in the towel just because the
l a y e r disbelieves the defendant's plea. What, then, should the honest l a y e r do? If the defendant
pleads not guilty and f m l y professes innocence, the layer's posture should be one of constant and
resilient suspicion of all incriminating evidence, including any prior admissions by the defendant himselt:
If, however, the defendant admits guilt in confidence but says to the l a y e r "I want to make them prove
it," then the honest layer's posture of suspicion is modified, to fit the client's own stoty. While the
l a y e r should still "mak[e] sure that the prosecution can prove the State's case with evidence that was
lawfully obtained and may lawfully be considered by the trier of fact,"53it would be dishonest to go so
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far as to controvert the truthfulness or credibility of witnesses whose testimony agrees with the client's
own version of the facts.54In other words, once the state does succeed in sufficiently proving its case
with lawfully obtained admissible evidence whose tenor the defendant does not in fact dispute, then the
defendant has received all that he or she is entitled to. If the l a y e r were to tty to undercut that
evidence, even though it is consistent with the defendant's own (confidential) stoty and the l a y e r has
no reason to doubt it, then the l a y e r would be departing from the "search for truth'' and embarking
upon a game. It would be, in short, to fabricate controversy.
Similarly, it would k dishonest for a l a y e r to present evidence favorable to the client if that
favorable evidence would be foreseeably and materially misleading in the absence of other facts that the
l a y e r is duty-bound to keep confidential. Such an abuse of confidentiality goes beyond the layer's
duty of "defending the proceeding [so] as to require that evety element of the case be e~tablished,"~~
and enters into the realm of creating alternative realities that are calculated to distract the fmder of fact.
In short, if the defense l a y e r has no truthful alternative stoty to sell, then the l a y e r cannot honestly
pretend there is one and, therefore, he or she is effectively consigned to merely testing the government's
case.56
While the foregoing discussion focuses on criminal defense, it is not meant to imply that
prosecutors should not also be subject to comparable, if not even stricter, prohibitions against coyness
with the truth. The only reason for stressing the defense context is that certain unique features of that
context (defendant's right to plead not guilty, the constitutional right to counsel and the presumption of
innocence) make a more extended discussion necessary.
better or worse, recent
Confidentiality in Federal Criminal Prosecutions-For
developments in kderal law suggest that the defense layer's duties of candor and full disclosure may,
at least in federal prosecutions, already be much broader than typically thought today. Consider, for
example, the layer's obligations under 18 U.S.C. 5 1001, as amended by the False Statements
Accountability Act of 1996:
5 1001. Statements o r entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States,
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I have heard the objection that, as a practical matter, a defense cannot be very effective if the jurors are not
presented with a credible case for innocence but are told, instead, that the only question for them to decide is
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knowingly and willfully(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entty;
shall be fmed under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel,
for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a
judge or magistrate in that proceeding.57
Notably, 5 1001 can apply to any out of court statement in any federal proceeding.
Consequently, if a federal prosecutor wants to fmd out what a defense attorney knows about the facts
of a client's case, all that the prosecutor needs to do, it seems, is to ask with appropriately probing
questions. The defense attorney could of course claim privilege and refuse to respond but, ifthe attorney
has a truthful answer that would work favorably for the client, then a refusal to answer promptly could
easily harm the client's interest-say, in subsequent plea bargaining. The delayed answer might seem too
much like a concocted stoty when offered up at a later date. Anyway, defense attorneys are ordinarily
eager to share exculpatoty facts with the prosecution and, indeed, if the defense attorney has a response
that would help the client, there would likely be a duty to answer.58That being so, the attorney's claim of
privilege would be eloquent in itself, an implicit revelation of the unfavorable or "damaging" information
whose existence the prosecutor seeks to confirm. By carefully framing the questions put to defense
attorneys, a prosecutor could easily gain at least enough such revelations to shatter a potential pleabargain or, if the attorney's "admissions" got to the jurors, to prevent an acquittal.
Unfortunately, the boxed-in defense attorney has little room to maneuver under 5 1001. Ifthe
attorney attempts to maintain confidentiality by deflection or other verbal ploys implying lack of
knowledge ("I don't know") or by "exculpatoty no''-type responses, he or she runs the risk of
committing a federal felony under 5 1001.59The statutoty language of 5 1001 is vety broadly worded in
prohibiting such verbal ploys ("conceals, or covers up by any trick scheme, or devicen6'). For its part,
the Supreme Court has cast doubt on the possibility that there are any implicit exceptions in 5 1001,
expressly rejecting the argument (in relation to 5 1001) that "the Court may interpret a criminal statute
more narrowly than it is ~ r i t t e n . ' ~ '

In short, unless the Supreme Court "fmds" an unwritten exception in 5 1001 in some future case,
the federal defense attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality may already be, in effect, subject to and
limited by a duty not to "conceal" or "cover up," imposed by federal law. There is, of course, the
constitutional right to counsel, but that right does not include the right to do any thing that would
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18 U.S.C. 5 1001 (emphasis added).

See MODELRULE$Rule 1.1 (Competence) and Rule 1.3 Diligence).
SeeBroganv. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)(holding that any out-of-court falsehood, even if only in an effod
to brush off an accusing question with a denial, is a violation of 5 1001).
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Emphasis added.
61
Id. at 810. Lest one think it far-fetched that federal prosecutors might stad going after defense attorneys, see Teny
CaJter, BurtingtheLawyers:Fedssh$dmg warfrom &@ins to crimmal defense bar, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 18.
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constitute "violating the law,I6' and 5 1001 is manifestly a law. The only way it might not be "law" is if
Congress does not have the constitutional power to make such a modification of the extant contours of
layer-client confidentiality, as we have come to know them. If not, then 5 1001, as applied to layers,
is unconstitutional. While there is some authority that there may be a degree of sixth amendment rightto-counsel protection for the attorney-~lientprivilege,~~
there is no reason at this point to think today's
Supreme Court will hold that the current balance between the rule of confidentiality and the trutb needs
of justice is written in constitutional stone."

VI. CONCLUSION
The justice system seeks to influence human behavior by providing various legal advantages and
imposing various liabilities whose application depends for the most part on the things that people do.
Many times people will see it as personally desirable to seek a legal advantage that is not merited under
the law or to avoid a liability that is called for by the law, given the facts of their own particular situation.
One effective way to do tbis is to fabricate controversy in order to make a play on the system and take
advantage of the potential for error, for chance or for other miscarriage that is inherent in legal process.
Another is to keep the actual facts of past events obscure. With a l a y e r who manipulates the facts, a
client can escape the intent of the law.
Abuse of confidentiality and fabrication of controversy are both tactics that can play a major
role in layers' effoa to lead the law to misapply. The fact that many lamyers tbink it is permissible to
do these things in order to help their clients escape the law's intent merely shows that there is a
widespread ambivalence toward the actual rule of law. However, the profession's responsibility to
justice does not permit l a y e r s to seize evety available legal victoty, irrespective of actual factual merit.
It does not permit the misuse of confidentiality as a sword that enables advocates to mislead by means
of calculated partial disclosures. It does not permit l a y e r s to fabricate controversy as a strategy to skirt
the rule of law. These two techniques may sometimes serve the interests of individual clients, especially
those who would be discomfited by full and impartial enforcement, but they bring the profession into
disrepute and, therefore, disserve the interests of clients and the nation overall.

In order to strengthen the public's confidence in the justice system we must make it easier than it
is now for the public to trust the l a y e r s who are its custodians. L a y e r s should never fabricate
controversy as a tactic to derail justice and should never abuse the duty of confidentiality by selectively
portraying reality in betrayal of that trust.
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Nix v. m t e s i d e , 475 U S . 157,166 (1 986). One must be careful not to overreadNix. It cannot be quite correct to
state, as the C o u t did i n N g that the lawyer's "overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause" is "[pllainly . . .
limited to legitimate, lawful conduct." Id. at166. Indeed, this statement seems to get things exactly backwards,
implying that the constitutional rights of the people are limitable by a legislature's laws. In actuality, of course, it is
the other way around with the legislature's power to make laws being delimited by the Constitution. Accordingly,
the threshold question in constitutional cases like N&is whether the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel even allows the "law" in question that purportedly limits the lawyer's representation effods. Even in the case
of a law that is as obviously constitutional as the law against suborning perjury (dispositive inNix), it begs the
question to simply assume that the law in question is constitutional.
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U S . at 753 n. 6 ("[Tlhe fact that the ABA may have chosen to recognize a given practice as desirable or appropriate
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